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Vulnerability disclosure

OpenAdapt is deployed next to sensitive systems. Security reports are taken seriously and handled through coordinated disclosure. Please do not open a public issue, discussion, or pull request containing vulnerability details.

Where to report

Component Channel
Open-source engine and packages (openadapt-flow, openadapt-capture, openadapt-privacy, and the other public repositories) GitHub's private advisory channel on the affected repository: Security tab → Advisories → Report a vulnerability (for the engine: report directly).
Hosted control plane (app.openadapt.ai), managed runner, hosted recorder Email hello@openadapt.ai with "Security" in the subject.

If you cannot use the private GitHub channel, open a public issue that contains no details and asks a maintainer to open a private channel with you.

What to include

The affected route, component, or repository; the impact; reproduction steps; and any suggested remediation. Do not include live customer payloads, credentials, screenshots, or other sensitive evidence in the first message — an appropriate transfer channel will be arranged if needed.

What to expect

  • Acknowledgment target: within 5 business days.
  • Affected versions are confirmed and the reporter is kept informed of the remediation plan.
  • Reporters who want recognition are credited after a fix is released.
  • Fixes ship forward on the latest released version; there is no long-term-support branch at this stage.

Scope

Explicitly in scope for the hosted surfaces: tenant-isolation failures, authentication or MFA bypasses, secret exposure, artifact-admission bypasses, managed-runner escape or egress failures, cross-organization access, billing-entitlement bypasses, and deployment supply-chain findings.

Engine-specific scope notes:

  • The compiled bundle and report.json intentionally retain literal identifiers (for the identity check and audit trail) behind a documented boundary. A report that these are exposed outside that boundary is in scope.
  • Identity crops sent to the on-prem VLM appliance are deliberately not scrubbed; the control is on-prem-only plus no-retention. Reports of retention or off-prem transmission are in scope.
  • Supply chain: GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA and dependencies flow through Dependabot; reports of a pinning gap are welcome.